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Introduction 
The paradigm of development "from below", like that "from 
above" is not, as might be assumed, simply related to the 
level at which decisions on development are taken. A change 
in level of decision-making is a necessary but not a suffi-
cient - and possibly not even the most important - condi-
tion for such a strategy. Development "from below" implies 
alternative criteria for factor allocation (going from the 
present principle of maximizing return for selected factors, 
to one of maximizing integral resource mobilization); diffe-
rent criteria for commodity exchange (going from the present-
ly-dominating principle of comparative advantage, to one of 
equalizing benefits from trade); specific forms of social 
and economic organization (emphasizing territorial rather 
than mainly functional organization; cf.Friedmann and 
Weaver, 1979) and a change in the basic concept of develop-
ment (going from the present monolithic concept defined by 
economic criteria, competititve behaviour, external motiva-
tion and large-scale redistributive mechanisms, to diversi-
fied concepts defined by broader societal goals, by collabo-
rative behaviour and by endogenous motivation). 
Development would need to be considered again as an integral 
process of widening opportunities for individuals, social 
groups and territorially-organized communities at small and 
intermediate scale, and mobilizing the full range of their 
capabilities and resources for the common benefit in social, 
economic and political terms. This means a clear departure 
from the primarily economic concept of development held in 
the 1950s and 1960s with its ensuing pressure on individuals, 
social groups and territorially-organized communities to 
develop only a narrow segment of their own capabilities and 
resources as determined "from above" by the world system, 
and neglecting other capabilities and self-determined objec-
tives in order to retain a competitive position in economic 
and political terms vis-a-vis the rest of the world. 
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Unlike development "from above", which was nurtured by the 
economic theories of the past three decades (particularly 
the neo-classical one), there seems to be no well-structured 
theory available as yet for an alternative paradigm of de-
velopment "from below". Some efforts in this direction have 
been undertaken: at international level by the search for 
a New International Economic Order (Tinbergen et al., 1976), 
or for "another development" (Nerfin, 1977); at the sub-natio-
nal level by such concepts as Agropolitan Development 
(Friedmann-Douglass, 1978), Ecodevelopment (Sachs, 1976), 
and the search for a "theory of rural development" (Haque 
et al., 1977). But there is still a pressing need for a 
coherent and systematic framework for an alternative approach. 
One reason for the lack of such a coherent framework may be 
that it would need to be supported by a variety of disci-
plines and not primarily by economics - as our present 
theory suggests - and the cumulative co-operation between 
different disciplines is apparently very difficult to achieve. 
In addition there may not be only one strategy of development 
"from below" - as has been the case for the predominatly 
monolithic industrialization-urbanization strategy "from 
above" to date. Beyond some basic common features, different 
cultural areas will need to construct their own development 
strategies which will require compatibility only at certain 
points of mutual contact. Alternatively, the contact points 
may need to be restricted to those types of interaction 
where compatibility is feasible and desired by each of them. 
Alternative strategies of development "from below" need 
to emerge from and be adapted to the requirements of 
different cultural areas. Such strategies may change over 
time, possibly alternating with phases of development "from 
above". The traditional development paradigm "from above", 
a center-down-and-outward paradigm, provides a starting 
point in the search for alternatives. 
The past three decades, dominated by development strategies 
"from above", have not led to decreased disparities in 
living levels. Disparities have in general increased as many 
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of the case studies in this book show. This applies both to 
disparities between social strata (Adelman and Morris, 1973) 
and between geographical areas (Stohr and Todtling, 1977). 
Both paradigms are conceptual constructs which in practice 
rarely occur in pure form. Real situations will always 
(especially in today's highly interactive national, conti-
nental and world-wide systems) consist of a mix of both 
these elements. In different national or regional situations 
there is undoubtedly considerable variation in the make-up 
of these two elements as well as in their temporal sequence. 
Let me briefly contrast the two concepts with each other in 
more-or-less pure form. 
A REAPPRAISAL OF THE"CENTRE-DOWN"PARADIGM 
As Hansen (Chapter 1)xhas shown, the concept of development 
"from above" assumes that development, whether spontaneous 
or induced, starts only in a relatively few dynamic sectors 
and geographic clusters, from where it will (or hopefully 
should) spread to the remaining sectors and geographic areas. 
This "trickle-down" process is essentially supposed to start 
at the global level (from world-wide demand, or world inno-
vation centres), and then filter down and outward to natio-
nal or regional units, either through the urban hierarchy 
(Berry, 1972), through input - output relations (Perroux, 
1955), or through the internal channels of multi-plant busi-
ness organizations (Lasuen, 1973; Pred, 1977), or large-
scale government organizations. 
Its emphasis therefore has been on urban and industrial, 
capital-intensive development, the highest available tech-
nology, and maximum use of external and scale economies. 
This usually involves: large investment projects; increasing 
scale of the private and public organizations required 
to transmit development through these integrated units; 
large redistributive mechanisms; and the reduction of 
economic, social, cultural, political and institutional 
x)see book-quotation on cover page. 
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"barriers" (including distance friction and institutional 
differentiation), which might hinder transmission effects 
within and between these units. 
The hypotheses upon which the paradigm of development "from 
above" is based, explicitly or implicitly, are: (1) develop-
ment in its economic, social, cultural and political dimen-
sions can be generated only by some very few select agents 
such as Schumpeter's (1934) entrepreneurial pioneer, the 
white, the urbanite, or the intellectual; (2) the rest of 
the population are considered "incapable of initiatives in 
making improvements, consequently everything must be done 
for them ... 11 (Uphoff and Milton, 1974:28-29); 
(3) these few agents are able and willing to allow all others 
to participate in this development within a reasonable time-
span and on a reasonably equal basis; (4) these other groups are 
able and willing to adopt the same type of development; 
(5) the specific type of development (economic, social, cul-
tural and political) initiated by the few select agents is 
the most suitable one for all the other members of the in-
creasingly-interactive system and should therefore replace 
other existing notions of development; (6) the (socially 
and culturally) new and the (economically and politically) 
more powerful notions of development are also the "better" 
ones and therefore the ones which the rest of society 
strives for. Essentially it therefore presumes an eventually 
monolithic and uniform concept of development, value systems 
and human happiness, which automatically or by policy inter-
vention will spread over the entire world. 
These notions are related very closely to the interests of 
the large-scale (private or government) organizations which 
were installed to serve as the "motor" of development. In 
many cases however these have in turn come to dominate 
the system, very often overruling the interests of those -
e.g. local and regional communities - they were meant to 
serve. This has led to a high concentration of power in 
a few private or governmental organizations which now 
dominate the greater part of the world system. At the same 
5 
time such a strategy ignores or overrules: (1) the great 
diversity of value systems and aspirations created by the 
differences - often historically grown and territorially 
defined - between cultural systems; (2) the great variations 
in natural conditions (which in part have brought about the 
latter); (3) the fact that with different aspirations and 
cultural and natural preconditions, the imposition of a 
uniform concept and measurement of development is bound to 
relegate some groups to what is today called "under-develop-
ment", leaving them further away from those set standards 
and plunging them still further into the role of the disad-
vantaged in any measurement of standards as defined by 
the dominant culture or group - as has been shown in another 
context (Stohr-Todtling, 1978); (4) that this subsequently 
leads to differing levels of "dependence" as has also been 
shown in the latter paper. Once such economically-disadvan-
taged groups start to interact more intensively with the 
more developed ones on the latters' terms, they are increa-
singly forced to adopt the same social, cultural, political 
and institutional norms in order to try to compete with them 
in economic terms, economics being the medium through which 
most large-scale interactions are channelled; (5) that this 
entails the subordination of broader societal and cultural 
values to economic determinants, a fact that can be observed 
in most highly-developed countries today. 
The alternative would be for economically less-developed 
social groups and areas to give clear priority to their 
own self-determined societal standards, and to subordinate 
external economic and other interactions to these standards. 
This increasingly is being demanded in fact by developing 
countries which are beginning to demand some form of collec-
tive self-reliance and which view increased nationalism as 
an important component of a "new meaning of development" 
(Seers, 1977). 
Normally, large-scale organizational linkages between areas 
of greatly differing levels of development lead (due to 
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factors such as unequal distribution of power, selective 
factor withdrawals, unequal terms of trade, unequal distri-
bution of scale economies) to increasing spatial divergence 
rather than a convergence of living levels. In other words, 
even with explicit regional development policies operating 
through large-scale private or public organizations, the 
sum of backwash effects in most cases still seems to exceed 
spread effects. 
With a "centre-down"development strategy this can only be 
avoided if at the national level there is both a strong 
control mechanism avoiding leakages to the exterior (a 
control on commodity and factor flows) and a strong internal 
redistributive mechanism with broad public participation. 
In large countries the same mechanisms might also be 
necessary at sub-national levels, to avoid major concentra-
tions of power. Few developing countries seem to have been 
willing (or able) to do this so far, and it will be inter-
esting to see the evaluation of respective experiences, 
particularly those of some of the more inward-looking de-
veloping countries of a socialist type to be presented in the 
present book. 
DEVELOPMENT "FROM BELOW" 
Development "from below" would require the control of the 
backwash effects of development "from above" mentioned be-
fore and the creation of dynamic development impulses within 
less developed areas. The crucial question is how these two 
requirements can be fulfilled. The first requires changes 
in the interaction between different regions and countries 
and will be treated here; the second requires the creation 
of endogenous factors of change for increased equity and 
developmental dynamics, and shall be considered in a later 
section of this chapter. 
Instead of optimizing selected factor components in a 
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"centre-down" fashion on a large (national or international) 
scale, thus "creaming" the human and natural resources of 
favoured segments of (national or regional) economies (Han-
sen, Chapter 1)~) the basic objective of development from 
below is the full development of a region's natural resour-
ces and human skills (what Richardson, 1973, calls "genera-
tive" growth), initially for the satisfaction in equal 
measure of the basic needs of all strata of the population, 
and subsequently for developmental objectives beyond this. 
Most basic needs services are territorially organized, 
and manifest themselves most intensely at the level of small-
scale social groups and local or regional communities. De-
velopment "from below" therefore would require that the 
greater part of any surplus (created through production spe-
cialization within an area) should be invested regionally 
for the diversification of the regional economy. By Region 
here we mean the smallest territorial unit above the rural 
village where such activities are still feasible (cf.also 
Friedmann and Douglass, 1978 on "agropolitan districts"). 
This process is then envisaged to occur at successively 
higher scales. Through retention of at least part of the 
regional surplus, integrated economic circuits within less-
developed regions would be promoted (Santos, 1975; Senghaas, 
1977) and development impulses would be expected to succes-
sively pass "upward" from the local through regional to 
national level. Policy emphasis therefore will need to be 
oriented towards: territorially-organized basic needs ser-
vices, rural and village development, labour-intensive acti-
vities, small and medium-size projects, technology permitting 
the full employment of regional human, natural and institu-
tional resources on a territorially-integrated basis. 
The basic hypotheses underlying a strategy of development 
"from below" are the following: 
(1) major regional disparities in living levels have 
emerged as the negative consequences of large-scale 
economic integration through the withdrawal effects 
. x) see l:x:xJk quotation on cover page 
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mentioned above. Previously regional civilizations 
developed independently, achieving broadly similar 
levels of material progress (Abdalla, 1978, p.19). 
Population distribution adjusted to the long-term 
resource potential of individual regions (except 
for unforeseen natural disasters) and the social me-
chanism on the whole retained a man-resource balance. 
(2) There are many concepts of development depending 
on the natural environment of different communities 
and the development over time of specific cultural 
and institutional conditions. In fact, these represent 
major factors of development potential and should not 
be subordinated to the short-term pressures of any 
externally-dominated or "anonymous" market mechanism. 
(3) The basic impulse for formulation and implementa-
tion of such differentiated concepts of development 
must come from within the respective communities. This 
requires discarding the presently-dominant hypothesis 
that small-scale (local, regional or national) commu-
nities can develop only through the intermediary of 
other more highly-developed communities or countries, 
and must do this by applying the latter's - usually 
materially defined - concept of development. Discarded 
also must be the presently-dominant hypothesis that 
in order to achieve this, poor communities must pro-
duce more commodities for demand of the rich ones (the 
export-base concept) at reduced cost and return to 
their own factors (mainly labour and natural resources) 
and in return, must receive transfers of capital, tech-
nology and organizational skill ("development aid") 
from the more developed countries. These factor trans-
fers, along with withdrawal of natural resources and 
unequal terms of trade, actually weaken rather than 
strengthen the comparative development potential of 
less-developed areas. They also reduce the respective 
communities' capacity to mobilize their own capital, 
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technology and organizational skills, thereby making 
them increasingly dependent on more developed areas. 
(4) There should be greater national and regional 
self-determination of the degree and type of inter-
action needed in these territorial units. Most "less-
developed" countries (as defined by developed countries' 
criteria) are under-developed mainly because of their 
reduced capability for formal large-scale interaction 
to provide goods and production factors for large-scale 
(international) interchange systems. Many such communi-
ties, however, have a much higher potential for infor-
mal small-scale interaction (interpersonal social re-
lations, group identity, small-scale solidarity, 
active cultural participation) than have materially 
highly-developed areas. Such small-scale potential 
(related to Allardt's (1973) conditions of "loving" 
and "being") is important to human beings but is 
usually not interchangeable at larger scales. It has 
use-value, not exchange-value, and therefore does not 
enter into the calculations of "comparative advantage" 
on a large (world-wide) scale, and cannot be measured 
by our usual indicators of development. These poten-
tials are however greatly affected - usually negatively 
- by economic, social and political transformations 
caused by a rapid integration into the world economy. 
This is visible in virtually all formerly colonial 
countries (Abdalla, 1978). 
Since such small-scale potentials, often operating on an 
informal basis, are also important for such necessities 
as social security, health care, environmental protection 
and education, quality of life in these sectors is often 
detrimentally affected by factor withdrawals, or by rapid 
social transformations brought about by large-scale econo-
mic development. Usually the State has to intervene through 
large-scale cost-intensive institutions to compensate for 
the informal social mechanisms which had served such pur-
poses before. But in less-developed countries this is 
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usually not feasible. 
Development "from below" therefore may require a certain 
degree of "selective spatial closure" (St6hr and T6dtling, 
1978) to inhibit transfers to and from regions or countries 
which reduce their potential for self-reliant development. 
This could be done by control of raw material or commodity 
transfers which contribute to negative terms of trade 
and/or by control of factor transfers (capital, technology) 
which lead to under-employment or idleness of other regio-
nal production factors, or to major external dependence. 
Instead of maximizing return of selected production factors 
on an international scale, the objective would be to in-
crease the over-all efficiency of all production factors of 
the economically less-developed region in an integrated 
fashion. This integration of territorially available resour-
ces and social structures should form a basis for more inter-
nally-initiated development impulses. 
Development of large-scale activities and centres will then 
primarily be based on territorially-defined local and regio-
nal inputs and demand, and will correspond to their require-
ments rather than the reverse. Large cities would not be 
able to grow as fast as they have in the past - which would 
help solve a key problem of spatial development in most 
developing countries. Benefits accruing from activities 
exceeding this scale would be subject to spatial redistri-
bution, Hoselitz's (1957) dichotomy between "generative" 
and "parasitic" cities would be rephrased: cities would primarily 
generate activities for their immediate hinterland rather 
than for an abstract interurban system. In this way the 
hierarchical urban-industrial system would essentially be 
sustained "from below" by the relatively stable (human, 
social, political and environmental) needs and potential 
of their territorial hinterland and its population, rather 
than by the fortuitous and uncontrollable trickling-down 
of impulses "from above''. Urban centres would develop pri-
marily as a supportive component of their respective hinter-
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lands, rather than the hinterland developing (as in the 
centre-down strategy), as a function of the selective 
requirements of the urban system. 
The spatial pattern of urban-industrial development resul-
ting from such strategies will be comparatively decentra-
lized and regionalized. As industrialization and service 
growth are based primarily on demand and resources within 
their respective regions and are not primarily export 
base activities (which should be promoted later at successive 
stages), the urban system will tend to be more inward-orien-
ted than the existing coastal patterns of developing 
countries which have resulted from the "centre-down" process. 
Urban centers will tend to maximize accessibility within 
their regions (on which their development primarily depends} 
rather than maximizing accessibility to the outside. Inward-
oriented urban systems which maximize internal accessibility 
provide the best conditions for equal provision of basic 
needs services to all parts of the population. This corres-
ponds to the urban pattern of those countries which were 
able to establish an urban system and an institutionally 
disaggregated (e.g. multi-tier federal) nation state before 
large-scale transport integration and industrialization 
took place. 
A strategy of development "from below"would need to combine 
selected elements of what Hirschman (1958) called advantages 
of integration (or "surrender of sovereignty") with selected 
elements of advantage of separatism or "equivalents of 
sovereignty". "If only we could in some respects treat a 
region as though it were a country and in some others treat 
a country as though it were a region, we would indeed get 
the best of both worlds and be able to create situations 
particularly favorable to development" (Hirschman 1958, 
p.199). The question is how and whether this is possible. 
The "advantages of integration" for less-developed areas 
would seem to lie particularly in free and self-determined 
access to technological and organizational innovation as 
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well as in access to potential markets for products surplus 
to their own need (Furtado, 1978). 
The advantages of "equivalents of sovereignty" would seem 
to lie in cultural and institutional semi-autonomy of less-
developed areas and in the possibility of a certain degree 
of "spatial closure'' (St6hr and T6dtling 1978) or a "cellu-
lar economy" (Donnithorne, 1972), in which barriers to 
free resource withdrawals, to negative terms of trade and 
a further concentration of power would be drawn along terri-
torial lines at different hierarchical levels. 
At least for a "cellular" socialist country such as China 
it is maintained that self-reliance together with decentra-
lized planning (as introduced in 1975) did not reduce the 
development potential of the poorest regions, but" ... seems 
to have narrowed ... interprovicial differentials ... even 
before the important state interprovincial transfer of 
funds have been taken into account" (Paine, 1976). It may 
well be that the mobilization of additional resources in the 
regions - beyond increasing the production and income of 
even poorer regions - may in fact increase aggregate growth 
and thereby make more funds centrally available for addi-
tional redistribution. 
Apart from these rather fragmentary strategy elements, is 
there a more coherent theoretical or practical experience 
available to development processes "from below"? 
Dudley Seers in his paper "The New Meaning of Development" 
(1977) maintains that we still lack a theory for an alter-
native development paradigm: 
" ... we do not yet understand much about what self-
reliance implies for development strategies, but some 
of the economic aspects are obvious enough. They 
include reducing dependence on imported necessities, 
especially basic foods, petroleum and its products, 
capital equipment and expertise. This would involve 
changing consumption patterns as well as increasing 
the relevant productive capacity. Redistribution 
of income would help, but policies would also be 
needed to change living styles at given income levels 
- using taxes, price policies, advertising and perhaps 
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rationing. In many countries, self-reliance would also 
involve increasing national ownership and control, 
especially of sub-soil assets, and improving national 
capacity for negotiating with transnational corporations. 
"There are other implications as well, especially in 
cultural policy. These are more country-specific, 
but as a general rule, let us say that 'development' 
now implies, inter alia, reducing cultural dependence 
on one or more of the great powers - i.e. increasing 
the use of national languages in schools, allotting 
more television time to programmes produced locally 
(or in neighbouring countries), raising the proportion 
of higher degrees obtained at home, etc .... " 
"On this approach, development plans would henceforward 
not put the main emphasis on overall growth rates, or 
even on new patterns of distribution. The crucial 
targets would be for (i) ownership as well as output 
in the leading economic sectors; (ii) consumption 
patterns that economised on foreign exchange (including 
imports, such as cereals and oil); (iii) institutional 
capacity for research and negotiation; (iv) cultural 
goals like those suggested above, depending on the 
country concerned .... " 
"Of course, an emphasis on reducing dependence does not 
necessarily mean aiming at autarchy. How far it is 
desirable, or even possible to go in that direction, 
depends on a country's size, location and natural re-
sources; on its cultural homogeneity and the depth of 
its traditions; On the extent to which its economy 
needs imported inputs to satisfy consumption patterns 
which have to be taken - at least in the short term -
as political minima. The key to a development strategy 
of the type suggested is not to break all links, 
which would almost anywhere be socially damaging and 
politically unworkable, but to adopt a selective approach 
to external influences of all types." (Seers, 1977, 
p.5-6). 
IN SEARCH OF A THEORY OF DEVELOPMENT "FROM 
BELOW": SOME HISTORICAL PARALLELS 
Niles Hansen has shown that the theoretical foundations 
of development strategies "from above" as practiced during 
the past two decades stem mainly from the economic theory 
dominant during the last quarter of a century, strongly in-
fluenced by nee-classical economic thought. Such strategies 
are still widely considered a prerequisite for further 
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economic progress, although in view of the results produced, 
increasing doubts are being raised. 
The lack of an alternative theory and practice for develop-
ment "from below" which Seers alludes to, refers in fact 
only to the period of the last thirty years, however. 
It is true that during this period development "from above" 
has been the dominant paradigm in the theory and practice 
of economic policy in particular, and in the evolution 
of the two systems of super-powers in general. This was 
the case with respect to the Western hemisphere, in spite 
of the fact that one of the major assumptions of classical 
and neo-classical economic thought is individual and in-
dependent private decision-making - seemingly the extreme 
opposite of the mechanism of development "from above". This 
contradiction becomes clear in hindsight however, as 
classical or "positivistic" economics was concerned essen-
tially with individual resource allocation for the produc-
tion of "private goods" (Machlup, 1977); the increasingly im-
portant production of public goods for collective objectives, 
however, needs to focus essentially on external effects and 
therefore requires different allocation mechanisms. In the 
Eastern hemisphere, the Soviet model is by definition 
based on the operation of a monolithic central planning and 
redistributive mechanism "from above" which has increasingly 
been challenged by peripheral countries in the Socialist 
sphere of influence. 
There have been many examples in previous periods however, 
under changing cultural and political conditions, of periods 
dominated by development "from below" intermittent with 
periods of development "from above", as we shall try to 
show has been the case in Central Europe. This has been 
done in spite of the fact that the present book deals 
mainly with Third World Countries, in order to show that 
the presently-dominant paradigm of development "from 
above" may not be as irreversible as it might seem in short-
term perspective and from an isolated economic point of view-
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The swing between these two approaches in the past seems 
to have been related to changing scales of societal inter-
action, to a changing subordination of rationalizing eco-
nomic activity under broader societal norms (philosophical, 
religious, political, social, etc.), and more recently, to 
changing rates of economic growth. Let me give a few 
short - and necessarily overly simplified - examples. A 
concise and very pointed description of these changing trends 
including their spatial dimension for earlier periods 
is contained in Heinrich (1964), for more recent periods 
in Kondratieff (1926), Schumpeter (1939) and Lewis (1978). 
For this purpose I shall go back into the history of econo-
mic and societal thought much further than Niles Hansen has 
done in describing the centre-down paradigm dominant during 
the past 25 years: 
Over the past 2.500 years the scale of societal and spatial 
interaction in specific cultural areas has changed at 
various times from periods dominated by small-scale societal 
interaction (from "below") to others dominated by large-
scale interaction (from "above''). Along with these changes 
have gone changes in socio-political institutions from 
small to large-scale and vice-versa. Furthermore, they were 
usually associated with changes in the dominant power struc-
ture between different social, political and religious groups 
within the respective societies. More recently these changes 
have also been associated with major technological innova-
tions (Schurnpeter, 1939, Lewis, 1978). Periods of dominating 
small-scale spatial interaction ("from below") tended to be 
irrationally and metaphysically dominated; they focussed 
on what Tourraine (1976) calls "ideological" accumulation. 
Firmly subordinated under such explicit societal norms 
(metaphysical, institutional, social, cultural, ritual, etc.) 
of the respective territorial community were specific func-
tional economic, technological and other rational activities 
or what Tourraine has called processes of "functional" accu-
mulation. These small-scale economic and societal interaction 
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patterns (small-scale compared to those of preceding or 
following periods) might be explained by the fact that 
irrationally-based (emotionally, sensually-based) human 
interaction is limited to a much smaller scale than func-
tional (abstract, rationally or economically-based) human 
interaction (Hall, 1966; Greenbie, 1976; Laszlo, 1977). 
Whereas the first kind of interaction takes place mainly 
in concrete (spatially delimitated) territorial space, 
the latter takes place primarily in abstract (functionally 
delimited) space (Friedmann and Weaver, 1979) and can 
therefore bridge distance much more easily. To put it in 
Allardtts terms, human conditions of "loving" and "being" 
depend much more on small-scale interaction, whereas the 
human condition of "having" benefits considerably from 
large-scale interaction. 
Laszlo (1974) assumes a continuous increase in scale of 
spatial interaction throughout history, whereas according 
to our hypothesis spatial expansion has oscillated con-
sicerably between rationally- and irrationally-dominated 
historic periods (see Fig.1). 
In periods of dominating large-scale spatial interaction 
"from above", such as during the past 25 years, functional 
(rational, including economic and technological) activi-
ties gained considerable autonomy from broader societal 
norms (metaphysical, institutional, social, ritual, etc.), 
and often even became supra-ordinate over them. This 
usually was accompanied by a rapid acceleration in the rate 
of innovation in many fields including production, trans-
port and communications technology. These innovations pro-
moted the rapid expansion of interaction scales which only 
functional processes could readily bridge. These periods 
of development "from above", possibly due to the destabi-
lizing effects of accelerated innovation (Laszlo) , in general 
tended to be much shorter than the preceding or subsequent 
periods of development "from below". These changes seem to 
have oscillated around a long-term trend towards increasing 
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scales of interaction, which however was periodically 
reduced once more to smaller scale, and thereby prevented 
from moving ahead at a continually fast rate. 
Figure 1 illustrates such periods of development "from 
above" and "from below". Samples are taken from specific 
periods in time and only from a relatively small part of 
the world: the Mediterranean and Central Europe. More pro-
found analysis is required on these issues, particularly 
on the impact each of these periods has had on the living 
levels of the poorest population strata. It is hoped that 
the present hypotheses will arouse the interest of historians 
in undertaking more systematic studies of the interrelations 
between scale of socio-economic interaction, rate of economic 
growth and spatial disparities in living levels. 
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Following are some of the examples (see also Figure 1): 
Greek Polis: 
In the Greek Polis, urban and economic development par-
ticularly in its initial phase was essentially self-reli-
ant (sometimes even autarchic within city states) and 
rather rigidly subordinated to the philosophical frame-
work of Nicomachean ethics and their norms of justice 
rooted in the works of Plato and Aristotle. The Pelis 
was a narrowly delimited territorial unit usually without 
tendency towards contiguous expansion. 
Instead, more-or-less rigidly organized city leagues 
were established. This period lasted for about half a 
millenium from the 7th century B.C. onwards. 
Roman Empire: 
During the first century and a half A.D. (Ceasar to Tra-
jan), the Roman Empire (see Figure 1) created the 
first "world economy", with a comparatively well-organized 
monetary, credit and transport system, and relatively 
little subordination to metaphysical norms. 
Middle Ages: 
In the 3rd. and 4th centuries A.D. there followed a 
reversal to a large number of small-scale economic areas, 
a receding of the monetary and credit economy, and an 
increasing orientation towards agricultural and rural 
forms. During the Middle Ages (Figure 1) economic 
activities for over four centuries were subjected to a 
multiplicity of religious and social restrictions, with 
emphasis on the concept of individual and common "need" 
determining a just price ("justum precium"), prohibition 
on taking of interest on capital, etc. 
The subjection of economic activities to philosophical, re-
ligious and social norms introduced important elements of 
solidarity (against those of competition), provided stabili-
ty (against the dynamics of an autonomous economic process}, 
and in general reduced the rate of societal change: the 
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relatively small-scale framework of the Greek Polis and the 
Medieval system lasted four or five centuries each; that 
of the Roman Empire only for one and a half centuries. 
Mercantilism: 
Towards the end of the Middle Ages, there occurred in 
Central Europe a change from the relatively self-con-
tained, small-scale agricultural and rurally-dominated 
interaction patterns of the 12th and 13th centuries 
to the increasing interaction radii of Mercantilism 
(Figure 1). The latter was intended to serve "as a 
unifying system" attempting to overcome the "economic 
disintegration" caused by feudal powers, by the system 
of river tolls and road tolls, and by "local disintegra-
tion in other spheres" (Heckscher, 1955). It was based 
on state-guided promotion of handicrafts and urban-based 
trade which created decentralized urban-centred regio-
nal economies and in which rural areas became strictly 
subservient to their urban centres. In the Mercantilist 
period, for the first time, explicit economic policy by 
the state existed and was scarcely embedded in metaphysi-
cal norms. The major objective was to increase the wealth 
of the State as a whole by producing sufficient amounts 
of the goods required for nourishment, material needs and 
comfort of its inhabitants. The (aggregate) positive ba-
lance of trade became an overriding objective, oriented 
towards the development of the state's economic potential 
and reduction of foreign economic influence. Major instru-
ments were the prohibition on import of final products, 
and export of raw materials and food products. All foreign 
commodities, particularly those serving "unnecessary 
luxury" rather than real needs, were banned from import 
and later were subjected to high tariffs. It was for the 
first time, though on a small scale, a centralist state-
run policy to develop to the maximum the full economic 
potential of individual states. Emphasis was on urban 
activities in a larger national context to safeguard 
political independence. At the same time it was the period 
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when the first overseas colonial acquisitions were made 
by European countries. 
Physiocrats: 
As a reaction to the previous urban and handicraft-oriented 
state-run economic policy there emerged in the second 
half of the 18th century, particularly in Central Europe, 
the first partial laissez-faire policy of the "Physio-
crats" (Figure 1). Laissez-faire principles, however, 
were mainly applied to commerce as their application in 
agriculture (the Physiocrats' key sector, according to 
Quesnay's Tableau Economique) would have made large rural 
regions idle. Free Trade thereby essentially fortified 
the power of the agricultural and administrative sectors. 
The directly-productive employment potential of cities 
was minimal as industrialization had barely started. 
Handicrafts and trade were considered ''sterile" acti-
vities. At the same time the rural unrest of the Peasant 
Wars was still remembered. Tariff protection for agricul-
ture, the key sector, was therefore a necessary exception 
to general laissez-faire attitudes, a restriction aiming 
at full employment of natural resources, especially of 
agricultural land. 
Classical Free Trade Era and First Kondratieff Up-Swing: 
Finally, towards the end of the 18th century the Englighten-
ment (Figure 1), classical economic theory and the free-
trade philosophy came into domination. By this time the 
chief country of origin of this doctrine, England had 
acquired sufficient initial advantage to benefit from 
such an economic arrangement. This c6incided with the 
upswing of Kondratieff's {1926) first "long economic 
wave". Although Kondratieff's waves are mainly based 
on variables indicating economic expansion (prices, pro-
duction, wages, etc.) they are also related to scales 
of spatial interaction (foreign trade). The initiation 
of Kondratieff's "long upswings" has been associated 
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with the enlargement of world markets by assimilation 
of new (and especially of colonial) countries, with the 
application of important discoveries and inventions in 
the technique of production and communication, and by ex-
tensive wars and revolutions (Samuelson, 1978). 
Along with it in many European countries came the elimi-
nation of rigid institutional restrictions in the fields 
of artisanry and commerce (guilds), and in rural acti-
vities (feudalism). Previous small-scale interaction 
units were transformed into larger, internally increasingly 
uniform political entities: the nation states of France, 
England, Sweden and Russia in the 18th century; Germany, 
Italy and the U.S.A. in the 19th century, etc. These 
nation-states increasingly enlarged their areas of influ-
ence on non-European continents as well. 
This period saw a major extension of European forms of deve-
lopment to other continents. In the previous Mercantilist 
and Physiocratic periods, colonies had mainly been considered 
as sources of prestige, monetary wealth (precious metals) 
and luxury goods (spices and tea, etc.), while their social 
and cultural systems on the whole were left intact with the 
exception of slave trade areas. With the emerging techno-
logical and industrial revolution in Europe in the latter 
part of the 18th century however, the role of colonies was 
increasingly transformed into becoming sources of raw materials 
for industry (cotton, wool, vegetable oils, jute, dyestuffs, 
etc.), and into potential markets for industrial products. 
In order to attain these objectives major social, cultural 
and legal changes were imposed upon the colonies by the 
motherland: (1) changes in existing land and property 
arrangements in the direction of private property, and the 
expropriation of land for plantation agriculture; (2) crea-
tion of a labour supply for commercial agriculture and 
mining, by means of forced labour, and by indirect measures 
aimed at generating a body of wage-seeking labourers; 
(3) spread of the use of money and exchange of commodities, 
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by imposing money payments for taxes and land rent and by 
inducing a decline in home industry; and (4) where the pre-
colonial society already had a developed industry (e.g., 
cotton in India), a curtailment of production and export by 
native producers. These changes were perpetuated by the 
introduction of legal codes, administrative techniques and 
the culture and language of the dominant power, and the 
promotion of a local elite willing to co-operate with the 
colonial power (Magdoff, 1978). Industrialization had thus 
led to a socio-political and cultural penetration (i.e. a 
territorial disintegration) of the colonies. A similar pro-
cess to this international one also occurred within most 
of these countries, in what has recently been termed "inter-
nal colonialism" (Hechter, 1978). 
The economic sphere had finally liberated itself from cen-
turies-old religious, ethical, social and institutional re-
strictions, and began to evolve as an autonomous field of 
activity. With rapid technological innovation and capital 
accumulation it turned from being a subject, into becoming 
a driving force for social, political, religious and environ-
mental transformation. The broader societal and environmen-
tal spheres became relegated to the status of "externalities" 
of economic processes, both in the original motherland and 
successively also in the dependent colonies. Substituted 
for former principles of solidarity, satisfaction of basic 
needs, justice, and integrated resource mobilization, were 
new criteria of competition, efficiency, selective world-
wide resource optimization, and survival of the fittest. 
Along with successive elimination of obstacles to increasing 
efficiency such as religious, ethnic and institutional 
barriers, came the reduction of state barriers and the intro-
duction of a nationless and spaceless economic doctrine. 
Intra-national and international trade became institutionally 
less and less differentiated. Tariffs were discarded as 
distorti~g comparative advantage and discriminating between 
social classes (by presenting gifts to the landowners!). 
Other territorially-manifested "externalities" in spheres 
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such as environment, employment of human and natural resour-
ces, social conditions, etc., were increasingly neglected. 
It was assumed (as later also in nee-classical economics) 
that under conditions of perfect competition and full mobi-
lity of factors, private efficiency and social welfare would 
converge. Foreign competition would lead to modernization 
of national manufacturing, and the principle of comparative 
advantage would increase efficiency, reduce prices, and as 
a consequence also wages; increased capital accumulation 
and increasing radii of spatial interaction would further 
raise over-all efficiency. The transformation of economic 
structures (once embedded in stabilizing complex societal 
norms) had taken place, into economic processes now autono-
mous and spaceless. Devoid of institutional or other societal 
constraints, a process of quantitative growth but also of 
qualitative deterioration and instability at a rate never 
know before, had started. 
In economic theory and policy, criteria for resource alloca-
tion such as "need" or "absolute cost" (locally or regionally 
manifested), were substituted by the concept of (world-wide) 
comparative advantag~. 
There were a number of important consequences: 
(1) this concept cemented the dominance of economic criteria 
over "external" (social, cultural or environmental) 
criteria as described above; 
(2) it promoted the systematic over- or under-exploitation 
of territorially-organized or less mobile resources, 
expecially land, human and institutional resources; 
(3) it initiated an increasing exposure of local and regio-
nal communities to external (national and international 
economic, and other) influences. The level of develop-
ment and the wealth of a regional or national community 
was no longer determined by the amount of resources 
{material, cultural, institutional, etc.) which this 
community was able to mobilize for the satisfaction of 
its own needs, but rather by the value attached {from outside) 
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to exportable segments of its resources in 
exchange for imported goods. The value of an imported 
commodity on the other hand was determined not by its 
local or regional production cost, but by the cost of 
export goods excranged for it, and by the elasticity of 
national demand for foreign goods, compared to that of 
foreign demand for national goods (the equation of inter-
national demand, Mill, 1848). This meant that terri-
torially-defined communities were not masters of their 
destiny any more, but had become subservient to the 
"objective" mechanism of worldwide commodity and factor 
markets and those national and international functional 
groups able to control them; 
(4) it created and perpetuated situations of "under-develop-
ment" along territorial lines, where following the 
previous argument, "less developed" regions or countries 
in order to develop had to reduce the cost (and price) 
of their export commodities (based mainly on an abundant 
supply of natural resources and cheap labour) in order 
to pay for imported finished goods and capital equip-
ment (based mainly on inputs of scarce capital and 
technology); the unequal distribution of surpluses reaped 
from these processes increasingly widened territorial 
disparities in living levels; 
(5) it promoted inequalities between social strata, parti-
cularly in developing countries, as the required reduc-
tion in cost of export commodities had to be achieved 
mainly via the reduction of real wage inputs in order 
to pay for imports of consumption or capital goods 
required by a small regional or national elite; 
(6) it promoted the extension of private or State capitalism 
through-out major parts of the world, as the "less 
developed" regions and countries, in order to close 
their capital and balance-of-payments gap, had to 
import capital or take on long-term loans and other 
(including political) commitments. 
27 
Economic interaction in fact seemed to have overcome distance 
friction as commodity and capital flows were able to reach 
the most remote corners of the globe. Aggregate economic 
growth and efficient use of scarce factors (particularly 
capital) advanced at a rate unheard of before. But terri-
torially articulated "externalities" and others distributio-
nally and structurally articulated (such as economic inequa-
lity, forceful transformations of political, cultural and 
social structures, fluctuations and disparities in level of 
employment of human and natural resources at national,regio-
nal and local levels) also exceeded any measure known before. 
A strong disintegration of territorially-organized communi-
ties and their environment, had taken place. Muller (1809) in 
fact had called Adam Smith's classical economics a theory of 
the successive and radical dissolution of the state. 
Romanticism and the First Kondratieff Down-Swing: 
It is therefore not surprising that the pendulum soon 
swung back again in the early 19th century. This swing 
coincided with what Kondratieff (1926) considered the 
first counter-wave after the upswing 1780 to 1810 . Paral-
lel to this down-swing and reduction of interaction scales 
there occurred a change from the previous rationalistic 
conception of the economy and society (enlightenment, 
classical economics), to the more irrational and meta-
physical conceptions of Romanticism (Figure 1) in 
Europe. There was substituted for the timeless and ubi-
quitous rationality of the previous period, a renewed 
emphasis on historical and territorial specificity (for 
example the German "historical" school of economics). 
The economy ceased to be considered as an autonomous 
field of activity, and was once more subordinated to 
normative societal and institutional constraints (e.g., 
by the "institutionalists" such as Thornstein Veblen 
in the U.S.A.). In contrast to the previous rationally-
oriented period of the Enlightenment and of functionally-
oriented classical economics, aestetic, irrational, 
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qualitative and structural elements - often defined 
in territorial terms - came to the foreground, such as 
man's relation to nature (Rousseau), Fichte's "Closed 
Conunercial State" aiming at maximum resource mobiliza-
tion for equal supply to all population strata; List's 
theory of broad intersectoral "mutually supporting" 
national economic development which, particularly for a 
country's intermediate agricultural-industrial transi-
tion phase, demanded the introduction of educational 
tariffs (List, 1840). There are many connections, by 
the way, between List's economic theory and self-reliant 
or "dissociative" development (Senghaas, 1977). Free 
trade was considered admissible only between countries 
at equal stages of economic development, and only once 
they had articulated internal structures which could 
retain the vital elements required for development, 
letting dissipate to the outside only the superavit. 
Otherwise, it was pointed out, free trade would cause ex-
ternal dependency and instability of production (Hilde-
brand, 1848; Lehr, 1877). Beyond monetary price and 
market conditions, the state has to consider the natio-
nal future and long-range development of an integral 
societal system (Schmoller, 1873). 
In contrast to the individualism dominant in the pre-
ceding period of classical economics, group solidarity 
again became an important objective and in this sense 
constituted a transition to subsequent Christian social 
(and also Conununist social) theories of the second half 
of the 19th century and subsequent periods. 
Christian - especially Catholic - social theory, in 
fairly consistent form over time starting from the en-
cyclica "rerum novarum" of 1891 onward, has emphasized 
principles of solidarity and subsidiarity, both in spatial 
and social terms. In spatial terms this has manifested 
itself in a call for federalism, in social and economic 
terms in the preference for a "corporate" structure of 
society based on natural law (but not however dominated 
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by the state, in contrast to Fascism). Communist social 
theory was much more exposed to changes over time. From 
a socialism and communism very much "from below" in its 
early anarchic, utopian and co-operative forms, it has 
moved increasingly to a socialism "from above" in the 
form of state communism and Leninism, intended to operate 
not only from the national but also from the internatio-
nal level downward. It would be going far beyond the 
scope of this chapter to discuss the complex development 
of theory and practice of these doctrines in more detail. 
However we have all more recently observed a tendency 
towards the lowering of the scale of societal reform 
to national (Euro-Communism) and even small-group levels, 
both in the East and West. Citizens' initiatives in East 
and West and the New Philosophers (particularly in France) 
rejecting the dominance of large-scale power, are symp-
tomatic of this. 
Kondratief f' s Second Long Wave : 
Returning to the earlier historical description, between 
1850 and 1873 there occurred a rapid expansion both in 
spatial interaction scale and in economic growth along 
with Kondratieff' s second up-swing ( Figure 1), followed 
by the down-swing of 1873 to 1895, and a concurrent con-
traction of international trade. 
Neo-Classical Era and Kondratieff's Third Long Wave; 
From about 1895 up until the First World War came Kon-
dratieff's third up-swing, coinciding with the neo-
classical economic era (Figure 1). 
World War I and the inter-war period of economic crises 
then led to an abrupt break-down of large-scale economic 
interactions, and to a trend towards national economic 
self-sufficiency (Hilgerdt, 1942), as well as towards 
increased intra-national political solidarity. This 
coincides with Kondratieff's third (1926) counterwave 
which in the event lasted unti 1 World War II (Figure 1) . 
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For many developing countries the breakdown of the civi-
lian overseas shipping network and the changeover of 
most industrialized countries to a war or crisis economy 
triggered import substitution and initial industrializa-
tion, thereby reinforcing intra-national economic circuits 
and intra-national interaction patterns. 
Post-World War II Exoansion 
In the late 1950s there occurred, particularly in the 
capitalist hemisphere, a successive replacement of the 
foregoing dominantly-territorial approach, again by a 
functional one, both in economic and spatial development. 
This can be related to the efforts towards reconstruc-
tion of Europe after World War II, and to the emergence 
of neo-positivistic scientific thinking. It coincides 
with the projection of what would have been the up-swing 
in a new Kondratieff cycle, to begin around 1948 and 
last for about 25 years until about 1973 (Figure 1), 
at which time a new important turning-point would have 
had to be expected (Kaldor, 1977). It actually occurred 
in reality. 
In economic development theory and practice this trend was 
initiated by Perroux (1955) in an attempt to show that the 
economy of nations (in this case the Germany of post-World 
War II) could grow not only by expanding their territorial 
borders but also by functional input-output relations across 
them with external dynamic sectors. Hansen (Chapter 2)xbas 
excellently analyzed this evolution of functional thinking 
in economic theory which constituted the basis for centre-
down development strategies. In the field of spatial develop-
ment theory and practice, Friedmann and Weaver (1979) have 
related this transformation of theory and practice to the 
introduction of the concept of the urban system as a natio-
nal network of interaction nodes (rather than the previous 
concern for individual cities}, and to the definition of 
systems of growth centres through which development was 
expected to "filter down" to all parts of a national territory 
x)see book-quotation on cover page. 
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(Berry, 1972). Friedmann and Weaver (1979) have also demon-
strated in concrete terms how_i in the U.S.A., regional planning 
has in the late 1950s shifted its major concern from conti-
guous territorial space to discrete functional space. In the 
last two chapters of their book Friedmann and Weaver present 
a similar finding for international development policy which, 
as they try to show, in the past decades has predominantly 
attempted to solve national and regional development problems 
and inequalities with what we here call strategies of develop-
ment "from above". 
This is where things stood around the middle of the 1970s. 
Since then the call for a reversal of development theory and 
practice which - as Friedmann and Weaver (1979) have shown -
had already started at the end of the 1960s during the 
"Second Development Decade'', became stronger and manifested 
in such thinking as the new periodical "Development Dialogue" 
(Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, Uppsala, since 1975), in publi-
cations of the International Foundation for Development 
Alternatives (Geneva), in a great number of so-called 
"basic needs" strategies (however fuzzy the term may be) 
initiated several years ago by the International Labour Office, 
and successively introduced into the programmes of most inter-
national development organizations (such as the World Bank, 
the Continental Development Banks, the U.N. Regional Commis-
sions and affiliated planning institutes - particularly 
those for Asia and Africa). 
Large-scale organizations such as the World Bank and the 
International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA, 
Laxenburg, Austria) are trying to develop methods for a 
more balanced integration and maintenance of these complex 
systems by modelling approaches towards "Redistribution 
with Growth" (Chenery et al., 1977 and various successive 
applications of this model) and by the use of systems ana-
lysis (IIASA). A number of applied studies based on the 
"Redistribution with Growth" model come to the conclusion 
that the ultimate requirements for the successful application 
of such large-scale balancing strategies, are basic struc-
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tural reforms within respective societies, accompanied by 
a redistribution of 1?owerrwealth and income (Adelman and 
Robinson, 1978) - but none of these analyses indicates how 
such crucial structural transformations are to be brought 
about. 
There is at the same time an increasing call for more "self-
reliant" development (however fuzzy this term also remains), 
initially for national units, but more recently for sub-na-
tional regional and even rural communities as well (Haque, 
Mehta et al., 1977). 
These efforts are all rather diffuse still, and it is im-
possible to do them justice in the present context, but their 
features are becoming consistently clearer and more coherent, 
and may well lead to what Friedmann and Weaver (1979) have 
called the imminent paradigm shift in development thinking 
and the doctrine of spatial development. This shift in develop-
ment thinking is most clearly and radically manifested in 
the Third World by the present strong Islamization of some 
Arab countries and their repudiation of both Western and 
Eastern rational value systems. It is symbolized in Europe 
by symptioms of a "new irrationalism", manifested for example 
by the New Philosophers who - comprising both former Marxist 
and Catholic personalities - oppose any kind of large-scale 
power structures, including the dominance of the State or 
of a positivistic science. These tie in with the European 
Romantic tradition of the nineteenth century and its protest 
against the State and a science made to dominate man 
(Coletti et al., 1978). 
We have thus shown that development doctrine in the past 
has alternated between different combinations of development 
"from below" and "from above". Individual stages have at 
times gone to extremes on either side, and swung back again. 
This description does not intimate any historical determinism 
or any automatic (inescapable) historical periodicity; but 
there appears to be some association - though with varying 
intensity - between on the one hand predominantly rationally-
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guided periods, rapid technological innovation, large-scale 
societal interaction patterns, large-scale formal organiza-
tions, emphasis on urban activities, a neglect of man-environ-
ment relations, a sub- or over-utilization of natural resources, 
and the decline of rural activities. These periods have fea-
tures of what we here call development "from above". 
On the other hand, predominantly non-rationally guided 
periods seem to be associated with control of technological 
innovation, a narrowing of societal interaction scale, a pre-
ference for informal organization, an emphasis on rural acti-
vities, love of landscape and nature, and a general emphasis 
on man-environment relations. These periods have many fea-
tures in common with what is here called development "from 
below". 
The swing from periods of development "from above" to those 
"from below" in many cases seems to have been prompted by 
one or several of the following phenomena: 
(1) the extension of interaction and dominance scales 
beyond the conflict-resolving capacity of the society; 
(2) the emergence of a few centres exerting decision-
making powers over increasingly large areas pushed into 
dependency roles; 
(3) resistance against pressure by the centres towards 
institutional and cultural penetration and uniformity; 
(4) rapid increases in application of new technology to 
production processes and the transport media (Schumpeter, 
1939), and the destabilizing effects these exert on 
societal structures (Laszlo, 1977); 
(5) increasing disparities in living levels and wealth, 
in part objectively brought about by large-scale resource 
withdrawals and unequal benefits from commodity exchange, 
and in part subjectively caused by the increasing scale 
of communication and the ensuing trend towards uniformity 
of aspirations and preference patterns; 
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(6) changes in terms of trade between industry and agri-
culture to the disadvantage of the latter (explicitly 
shown for the Kondratieff down-swing 1873 to 1896, cf. 
Lewis, 1978, p.27); 
(7) unequal or foreign utilization and the partial idle-
ness of human, institutional and natural resources (re-
sulting from over-utilization in some areas, and under-
utilization in others); Axinn ( 1977) for example, con-
siders the degree of integrated resource utilization as 
the major criterion for the under- or over-development 
of social systems); 
(8) neglect of provision of basic needs for the whole 
population, and lack of broader systems-wide solidarity; 
(9) increasing instability of systems due to lack of 
broader common societal norms. 
Many of these points in fact are critical issues in today's 
world-wide problems. It is true that reversal of these 
trends in the past has often been accompanied by violence 
and bloodshed. This makes the early initiation of such 
changes all the more necessary, particularly if they are in 
the interests of the poor who make up the majority, before 
too great tensions have built up and while a smooth transi-
tion is still feasible. 
We have dealt mainly in our analysis with the evolution of 
development doctrine in Europe. For long periods (at least 
until the end of the Middle Ages), the evolution of a com-
parable doctrine in other parts of the world may have followed 
different paths, and with varying cyclical time sequences, 
such as Silberman (1978) describes for Judaism and Axinn 
(1977) for ancient Hindu and Buddhist thinking. For the 
post-Colombian period in Mexico, such relations between eco-
nomic/political variables and scales of territorial integra-
tion have been showrt by Friedmann and Garde ls ( 19 79) • From the 
time of the European Enlightenment, industrialization and 
Capitalist expansion however, the development doctrine of 
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Europe (and later of North America and the Soviet Union) 
penetrated more and more into other parts of the world and 
has led to a relatively small number of world-wide develop-
ment paradigms, all essentially operating with mechanisms 
"from above". 
The present demand of many materially less developed coun-
tries (as well as less developed sub-national areas and 
social groups) for more self-reliant development may in fact 
be an effort not only to escape from or to change, the 
I 
established economic and institutional channels of centre-
down development, but also to change the present predomi-
nant value system oriented towards rationalistic and material 
objectives and steered by large-scale interaction and orga-
nizational systems. 
This paradigm shift may be starting from the functional and 
geographic peripheries - far from the major nodes of the 
present global interaction system- which have been increasing-
ly frustrated by this value system and the institutional 
structures sustaining it. Or is this just an idealistic 
notion of a few intellectuals in both industrialized and 
developing countries? The broad pressure in this direction 
on the part of many sub-national, territorially-organized 
ethnic groups on a concerted multi-national basis even in 
the European periphery (Kiljunen, Schaffer, Seers, 1979) 
seems a sympton of broad political relevance. Such an al-
ternative strategy of development "from below" might - at 
least for certain parts of the world (and possibly for 
a transitional period) be the only way to escape from 
a downward spiral of increasing disparities and under-de-
velopment. 
PROBLEMS OF TRANSITION FROM DEVELOPMENT "FROM ABOVE" TO 
DEVELOPMENT "FROM BELOW" 
Most developing countries have historically been exposed 
to external interaction and colonial dependence, for varying 
length of time. The question therefore in most cases (except 
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possibly for some isolated pre-capitalist societies) 
is not how to start a new development "from below" (as 
some European and other countries have done in alternating 
stages centuries ago), but rather whether and how is it 
possible for developing countries and regions today to 
transform the past sectoral and spatial patterns of develop-
ment "from above" to incorporate more elements of develop-
ment "from below", and thereby reduce existing social and 
spatial disparities in levels of development. One of the 
problems of development "from below" is that there is 
neither a uniform concept to strive for nor a uniform tran-
sitional process to follow. Each country and region may 
therefore have to devise its own strategy, although some 
basic characteristics will be the. same. 
Recent development "from above" assumed that the ultimate 
objective for each country and region should be to reach 
a high degree of industrialization and urbanization resem-
bling the structures of the most developed countries today, 
by a unilineal process of increasing the use of capital, 
technology and energy, and by utilizing ever-increasing 
agglomeration and scale economies in order to participate 
with increasing specialization in the world-wide market 
according to their comparative advantages in factor endow-
ment, which in fact rarely occurs precisely in this fashion 
as Streeten (1974:262) and Stohr and Todtling (1978) indi-
cate. 
Alternatively, development "from below" means the institu-
ting of a diversity of structural objectives and transi-
tion paths - as discussed earlier, with the broadest possible 
participation of the respective communities. Development 
"from below" h~ver does not mean a negation of growth 
objectives which, in view of the great material needs 
particularly of poor population groups and regions in de-
veloping countries, would be irresponsible. It means in-
stead basing growth on increased and integrated resource 
mobilization in a regional context rather than on selective 
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resource withdrawal under optimizing criteria derived from 
the world market. 
The possibilities of changing formerly externally-oriented 
economic functional and geographic structures (e.g., urban 
and transport networks) to more region-serving and equitable 
ones will vary •Developing regions or countries with a high 
degree of external interaction (and possibly dependence}, 
with small internal markets but high-value saleable resources, 
may in fact need to proceed at an accelerated pace through 
the raw-material export - capital goods import - export diver-
sification sequence (described by Paauw and Fei, 1973, 
for "small open economies" such as Taiwan and Thailand}. 
Other larger regions - or countries with sizeable potential 
internal markets, few saleable resources and strong autoch-
thonous cultural traits - might f1nd the change to a more 
self-reliant development strategy not only easier but also 
more useful in solving their own problems (various regions 
of India are cases in point). Institutional constraints 
unfortunately may be inverse. In large countries it may 
be more difficult to change existing social and economic 
structures unless heavily populated regions are still not 
integrated into the national economic and political system 
(Goulet, 1979}. 
Equally, countries with strongly outward-oriented urban and 
transport systems may have more difficulty moving towards 
self-reliant development than countries with internally-
oriented urban and transport systems. There seems to be a 
relatively strong relationship between the direction (inward 
or outward} of the dominant functional relations of an eco-
nomic and social system and the spatial pattern of its urban 
and transport network (Appalraju and Safier, 1976; Taafe, 
Morrill, Gould, 1973). Some countries have already reacted, 
perhaps intuitively, to this fact and have taken drastic 
steps towards changing the spatial structure of their urban 
and transport network, e.g., by transferring their national 
capital from an outward-oriented (coastal} location to an 
inward-oriented, central one (e.g., Brazil, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
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Tanzania), although this in itself does not mean that the 
functional system has also been transformed. It will be 
interesting to see from case studies what an impact the re-
location of the national capitals in these countries has 
on changing the entire spatial structure of the urban system, 
economic relations, and the spatial disparities in living 
levels. 
Finally, doubt is often expressed that societal change towards 
more egalitarian social, economic and political structures 
can be initiated from within local, regional or even national 
societies. External influence transmitted through contact 
with agents of external change is frequently considered a 
prerequisite for bringing about more egalitarian social, 
economic and political structures. 
Contrarily, evidence that such change can also be initiated 
by internal forces is perhaps not so spectacular and there-
fore not as widely publicized as external intervention (an 
extreme of external influence); but such evidence exists. 
A few examples since World War II have been Yugoslavia, 
Cuba, Portugal and Spain, transformation in the first two 
taking place despite the opposition of neighbouring external 
powers, while in Iberia only some complementary support from 
outside functional units (national or international politi-
cal parties, trade unions, church organizations) was re-
ceived. In the many cases however where societal change has 
been induced by outside agents {mainly supported by one or 
other of the two "super-powers") it has not in fact led to 
more egalitarian structures, but rather to external impo-
sition of a leading stratum as the link between the country 
and the external change agents in an effort to retain their 
influence. Such leading anti-egalitarian strata have been 
externally established both in capitalist and in socialist 
spheres of influence. 
At the sub-national level similar conditions apply. Natio-
nal liberation movements have often gained decisive momen-
tum from peripheral sub-national areas and from there have 
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reformed the entire national societal system. On the other 
hand many "revolutions" initiated in the national capital 
have soon led to petrified national power structures, ex-
tended over peripheral regions by nationally-appointed 
governors (even in formally-democratic federal systems as 
found in various Latin American countriest by central planners 
or by centrally-responsible regional administrators. It is 
therefore assumed that to operate in a sustained way, socie-
tal change towards more egalitarian structures, as well as 
towards broad economic, social and political development, 
has to be supported from within the social system. The fact 
that inward-motivated, "cellular" (Paine, 1976) or "segmen-
tary" (Renfrew, 1973 b) societies can in fact have non-
hierarchical, relatively egalitarian structures was demonstra-
ted by the aforementioned authors for quite different 
time periods and geographic areas, as well as for earlier 
(precolonial) social patterns on the continents analyzed 
here, many of which are today called "under-developed". 
Examples are pre-capitalist agricultural societies in Asia 
(Haque et al., 1977), pp.16 and 51), in Africa (Brooks, 
1971) and in some parts of pre-colonial Latin American so-
cieties (Clastres, 1974). Various case studies in this book x) 
also refer to this fact (e.g., chapter 8, Conyers on Papua-
New Guinea, and chapter 9, Blaikie on Nepal). 
A STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPMENT "FROM BELOW" FOR LEAST DEVELOPED 
REGIONS IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES 
The available evidence as quoted above indicates that tradi-
tional spatial development policies, (predominantly of the 
centre-down-and-outward type) in most cases have not been 
able - at least within a socially or politically tolerable 
time span - to improve or even stabilize living levels in 
the least-developed areas of Third World countries. Alter-
native spatial development strategies therefore should be 
urgently considered. The idea of solving problems of spatial 
disparities in living levels in Third World countries by 
increased urban-ward migration from peripheral areas has 
x)see book quotation on cover page 
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meanwhile been widely discarded in view of the utter futility 
of trying to absorb such masses of migrants into restricted 
urban labour markets, and supplying basic urban infrastruc-
ture and services for them. 
As an alternative, the possibility of a development strategy 
"from below" is discussed in this chapter. It might be par-
ticularly suitable for the many areas which in the near 
future cannot expect to benefit from traditional "centre-
down" development strategies. At the very least it can be 
used as a transitional strategy while competitiveness with 
the world economic system is improved, and it might be 
especially useful for sub-national peripheral (predominantly 
rural) areas with the following characteristics (Stohr-Palme, 
1977): 
{1) contiguous less-developed (predominatly rural) areas 
with relatively large population size providing a poten-
tial internal market for basic services and commodities; 
(2) a low per-capita resource base {natural resources or 
human skills) for world-wide demand; 
(3) low living levels compared with other regions and 
distant from developed core regions; 
(4) few internal dynamic urban centres able to absorb 
large rural populations into their labour market, infra-
structure or service system; 
(5) areas sufficiently different in socio-cultural aspects 
from their neighbours to have a regional identity of 
their own. 
Development "from below" needs to be closely related to 
specific socio-cultural, historical and institutional con-
ditions of the country and regions concerned. No uniform 
patent recipe for such strategies can be offered as is 
often done for strategies of development "from above". The 
guiding principle is that development of territorial units 
should be primarily based on full mobilization of their 
natural, human and institutional resources. In this context, 
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the following elements are seen as essential components 
of development strategies "from below": 
(a) Provision of broad access to land and other terri-
torially-available natural resources as the key pro-
duction factors in most less-developed areas; in many 
pre-capitalist African, Asian and Latin American 
societies this was the case and sometimes still is, 
but it has been superseded since colonization by Euro-
pean systems of private land ownership. Retention 
or introduction of fairly equal access to land and 
natural resources (e.g., by land reform) seems an 
essential prerequisite for equalizing income, achie-
ving broad effective demand for basic services, and 
creating broad rural decision-making structures, 
essential for development "from below". 
(b) The introduction of new or revival of the old 
territorially-organized structures for equitable 
communal decision-making on the integrated allocation 
of regional natural and human resources. These terri-
torially-organized communal decision-making processes 
would have to extend also to the processing of regio-
nal resources, to regional allocation of surpluses 
generated from these activities, and the introduc-
tion of regionally-adequate technologies (Goulet, 1979). 
Such structures for territorial governance should be 
established at different territorial levels and should 
operate on a mutual contracting basis (Friedmann, 
1978, 1979), and the decision-making potential of 
lower territorial units should be exhausted before 
higher levels become involved. 
(c) Granting a higher degree of self-determination 
to rural and other peripheral areas in the utiliza-
tion or transformation of existing (or the creation 
of new) peripheral institutions to oromote diversified 
peripheral development in line with self-determined 
objectives - instead of utilizing primarily-external 
institutions to promote development by externally-
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defined (mainly core-region) needs and standards. 
This should lead to a greater balance between peri-
pheral and core-region population groups in decision-
making powers at all government levels. This should 
facilitate the retention in peripheral areas of a 
greater share of the surplus generated there, for 
the mobilization of own resources. An important role 
in this context could be played by "agropolitan 
districts" suggested by Friedmann and Douglass (1978). 
(d) Choice of regionally adequate technology oriented 
towards minimizing waste of scarce, and maximizing 
use of regionally-abundant resources. For most less-
developed areas such technology would therefore have 
to save capital and facilitate full employment of 
the region's human, institutional and natural resour-
ces, as well as taking careful note of regional cul-
tural patterns and value systems. 
It should furthermore contribute to the recuperation 
of renewable and the preservation of non-renewable 
natural resources in the region, which Furtado (1978) 
sees as a starting-point in the struggle against 
dependence. Idle regional resources should be used) 
with the priority being to improve local and regional 
infrastructure, possibly by community self-help. 
Regionally adequate technology should furthermore, 
according to the region's conditions, "be simple 
to iearn and quickly implemented, and produce some-
thing for which there is a genuine demand (Vacca, 1978). 
The application of labour-intensive technology and 
the improvement of basic infrastructure will at the 
same time promote the creation of broad effective 
demand, as Lele (1975: p.189) suggests. 
(e) Assignment of priority to projects which serve 
the satisfaction of basic needs of the population 
(food, shelter, basic services, etc.), using to a 
maximum regional resources and existing formal or 
informal societal structures. Such a priority - rather 
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than the one given presently to export-base produc-
tion - would reduce dependence on outside inputs and 
the backwash effects caused by them discussed earlier 
in this chapter. Thus the strengthening of local and 
regional economic circuits is emphasized (Santos 
1975) and the promotion of local and regional trade 
and service facilities for consumer goods and agri-
cultural inputs, and regionally-based activities are 
stressed such as food processing, animal breeding, 
power supply, repair of agricultural machinery, etc., 
preferably by co-operative local or regional groups 
(Haque et al, 1977, p.64). 
(f) The introduction of national pricing policies 
which offer terms of trade more favourable to agri-
cultural and other typically peripheral products; 
(g) In case of peripheral resources being insufficient 
for satisfaction of peripheral (e.g., rural) basic 
needs, external {national or international) assistance 
would be solicited but should be mainly considered 
as compensation for the eroding effects of previously 
emerging dependencies; this external assistance should 
be oriented mainly towards (1) the fuller productive 
utilization of peripheral human and natural resources, 
(2) the satisfaction of basic needs of the peripheral 
population, (3) the improvement of intra-peripheral 
transport and communication facilities, and (4) the 
formulation and implementation of locally-initiated 
social and economic projects for the further pro-
cessing of peripheral resources and the satisfaction 
of basic needs; the allocation of such external 
assistance should be made with majority participation 
of local and regional decision-making bodies; 
(h) Development of productive activities exceeding 
regional demand (so-called export-based activities) 
should be promoted only to the extent that they lead 
to a broad increase in living levels of the population 
of the territorial unit. Otherwise, "the monetary 
44 
wealth it can get in excess of the needs of national 
(regional, local) development stimulates conspicuous 
consumption, investment in ... prestige projects, 
... moreover the surpluses are deposited or invested 
mainly in industrialized nations, regions or centres" 
(Abdalla, 1978). Priority should be given to activi-
ties which promote (1) full employment of regional 
labour and natural resources; (2) the application of 
technology to safeouard full employment of regional 
resources; ( 3) competitiveness in extra-regional mar-
kets by qualitative product differentiation, rather 
than by purely quantitative price competition in 
standardized mass production; (4) particular promo-
tion should be given to small-scale labour-intensive 
activities in rural areas, building on autochthonous 
technologies or developing them further, as these 
usually permit the most efficient use of all locally-
available resources, a maximization of output with 
available resources, the greatest adapt.ability to 
specific regional demand, and broad distribution of 
the income generated; (5) if competitiveness on ex-
ternal markets seems to require introduction of large-
scale technology, the adaptation of locally- or regio-
nally-available technology and improvement of local 
production conditions by local resource inputs (in-
cluding communal self-help) should be attempted first· 
(j) Restructuring of urban and transport system to 
improve and equalize access of the population in all 
parts of the country to them, rather than strengthening 
such systems oriented to the outside. If both these 
systems are heavily oriented externally, this may 
require a relocation of major urban functions (in-
cluding national government) from peripheral (e.g., 
coastal) locations to the interior of the country. 
This should also apply to intermediate-level functions 
and the improvement of intra-regional accessibility 
within peripheral areas in order to improve their 
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relative starting position. In case of competing 
demands between such functions at national and sub-
• 
national levels, preference would have to be given 
to the improvement of intermediate urban functions 
in peripheral areas (e.g., educational facilities 
oriented to specific regional development potentials) 
able to retain development impulses within the region, 
rather than giving priority to national functions 
and national transport integration which might drain 
development potential into the core regions. 
(j) Improvement of rural-to-rural and rural-to-village 
transport and communications facilities (rather than 
the present priority given to rural-to-large-urban 
communications) should have preference, in order to 
(1) increase commodity and service markets within 
peripheral areas - thus permitting realization of 
economies of scale and a better supply of basic ser-
vices to all parts of the population, (2) increase 
the scale and diversity of factor markets within 
peripheral areas in order to reduce production costs, 
and thereby (3) facilitate increased processing, 
purchasing and marketing activities in peripheral 
areas sustained by peripheral groups, and a more de-
centralized national pattern of capital accumulation 
with greater participation of peripheral areas. 
(k) Egalitarian societal structures and a collective 
consciousness are important prerequisites for a 
strategy for development "from below". They should 
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by preference be retained or initiated through in-
ternal (local or regional) initiative. Where this is 
not possible, external support may be necessary. This 
applies at different levels of society, such as the 
level of the small group (basic rights of children, 
women, etc.), or that of local or regional units (re-
duction of the power of vested territorial interest 
groups). Where such external support "from above" 
is necessary it should be facilitated, both between 
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and within countries, preferably on a non-government 
basis, through ideological or religious groups, or-
ganizations of committed intellectuals, through 
"link cadres" (Haque et al., 1977), or Independent 
Volunteer Cadres (Monlik, 1979) - as local or regio-
nal government representatives will tend to feel 
responsible to their hierarchical superiors rather 
than to their target groups (Haque et al., 1977). 
ON THE FEASIBILITY OF DEVELOPMENT "FROM BELOW" 
The most frequent reaction to proposals like the above, even 
from professionals open to change, is one of "scepticism 
about the concrete possibility of implementing such an attrac-
tive change of world conditions" (Vera Cao-Pinna, oersonal 
communication, Nov.1978). 
There is nothing more convincing than reality. Let me there-
fore point to some instances where approaches similar to 
those proposed above have actually been implemented with 
some success. Most of these examples are on a relatively 
small regional scale at sub-national level. Experiences on 
such a small scale are usually not recorded centrally - much 
in line with the macro-structure of our dominant information 
systems - and in fact many more probably exist all over the 
world. Only recently, institutions such as the Internatio-
nal Foundation for Development Alternatives (IFDA), Geneva, 
or the International Research Center on Environment and 
Development (CIRED) in Paris, have started to collect and 
report systematically on such efforts of small-scale alterna-
tive development. Further examples are given by Lo and Salih 
( Chapter 5) . x) 
Here are some examples which have been more systematically 
reported upon: In Asia the Santhal Movement in Bihar, India 
(Haque, Mehta et al., 1977: p.20 ff.), based mainly on local 
common use of implements and labour and on common local 
contributions in kind for night school, political activities, 
etc.; 
x) see book quotation on cover page 
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The Bhoomi Sena (Land Army) movement by some groups of the 
Adivasi aboriginal inhabitants of India who in total comprise 
about 50 million people (Silva, Mehta et al., 1979), based 
mainly on regaining access to land, the abolition of bonded 
labour and creation of village forums; 
The Rangpur Self-reliant Movement in Bangladesh (Haque et al., 
1977, p.32 ff.), based mainly on communal decision-making 
on the use of land and its proceeds, on the communal purchase 
of agricultural inputs, the reduction of dependence from 
external loans, and communal labour for economic infrastruc-
ture; 
The Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement in Sri Lanka (Goulet, 1979, 
p.6), based on student volunteer participation in local 
infrastructure work and on motivating local community deli-
beration and action; 
The Quechua Alto Valle co-operatives in central Bolivia 
(Goulet, 1979), oriented mainly towards the co-operative pro-
duction of woolen products and ceramics; the decisions of 
the co-operative are subordinated to the broader interests 
and values of the entire territorial community: this restricts 
the introduction of new technologies to those "which are in 
harmony with ancient Quechua rural values of mutual help and 
sharing the benefits in all improvements", and to "assigning 
a share of the surplus to all members of the village, whether 
they belong to the co-operative or not". (Goulet, 1979, p.13). 
An Agricultural Development Project for the Altiplano in the 
Peruvian province of Puna (Morlon, 1978), oriented towards 
mobilizing the endogenous development potential of large 
hi~hland areas and their agricultural and forest resources 
(including agricultural infrastructure such as extensive 
terraces, etc.) which have become depleted by changes in the 
natural and in the social environment (including the take-over 
by large sheep-breeding "haciendas''). 
Different programmes for the evolution of rural space in 
mountain areas and unproductive Mediterranean regions of 
the Pyrenees and various other French regions (Poly, 1977) 
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involving the integrated transformation of agrarian structures, 
land-use policies and modifications in production systems 
oriented mainly towards sylvo-pastoral activities; similar 
programmes are being undertaken by Longo Mai co-operatives 
in Costa Rica based on experiences of this international group 
of co-operatives in Mountain areas of the French Provence, 
of Switzerland and southern Austria. 
Many of these examples are explicitly built on autochthonous 
value systems and principles of community collaboration, de-
cision-making and the sharing of proceeds. In a number of 
them, for example in the Quechua co-operatives of Bolivia, 
rational decisions such as the introduction of new technolo-
gies, are explicitly subordinated to the community's 
wider and more basic cultural needs (Goulet, 1979, p.13). 
Most of these examples are relatively small in scale, although 
some of them are spreading to neighbouring areas or to other 
communities suffering from similar phenomena of under-develop-
ment in their present relations with the outside economy. 
Such movements "generated internally from within ... their 
own experience (of the daily life of its villagers) are 
like bubbles that will disappear and tend to be forgotten 
unless external forces . . . sustain them" (Haque, Mehta et al. , 
1977, p.35). Lack of support from higher levels (particularly 
national) may be a major reason why such examples have hardly 
developed on a larger scale (except temporarily in China). 
A recent case where autochthonous local development appears 
to be successfully supported by the state is in West Bengal 
in India, via the reformed revival of traditional local 
panchayat institutions (Marshall, 1979). While general 
support needs to come from national governments, concrete 
action should preferably come from independent groups such 
as "committed link-cadres" (Haque, Mehta et al., 1977 ,p.61) 
as mentioned above. The major limiting factor for expansion 
of such initiatives today seems to be fear of central (natio-
nal or international) decision-making centres that they 
might lose control and their competitive efficiency vis-a-vis 
other states, enterprises or power blocks. 
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Does this mean that the success of development "from below" 
will to a great extent hinge - even if more equitable social 
structures can be achieved at different sub-national and 
national levels - on the reduction of international tension 
and competition, particularly between superpowers, and 
successively also between nation-states, regions, and ulti-
mately between individuals? 
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